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Conceptualising Islamic "Radicalisation" in Europe through “Othering”: Lessons from the 
conflict in Northern Ireland 
 
Introduction 
Recent terror attacks across Europe have raised concerns about the issue of “radicalisation” amongst 
sections of the Islamic populations. In particular, the attacks have highlighted the need to better 
understand how “radicalisation” processes occur; in what ways they might be prevented and, indeed, 
how they might be reversed.1 
This paper argues that there is a need to move away from current discourses around “radicalisation” 
as being a negative process that lends itself to generating violent extremism.2 Rather, the paper 
suggests that the Freirean definitions of “radicalism” and “sectarianism” provide a better conceptual 
approach to the issues currently faced in Europe and, indeed, that a programme of political 
“radicalisation” may actually be part of any solution to the threats faced.3  
To present this analysis the paper situates current discourses around “radicalisation” within the 
experiences of Northern Ireland and particularly the factors that helped to generate and maintain 
conflict over a sustained period of time. Using the concept of “Othering”4, the paper explores the 
origins of the Northern Ireland conflict during the 1960s and assesses how the Irish Republican Army 
(IRA) came to appeal to so many young people.5  
 To develop these arguments a number of methodological approaches will be adopted. In the 
first instance, a literature review will help to critique current approaches to “radicalism” and processes 
of “radicalisation”. This review will establish the primary argument of the paper that better conceptual 
approaches can be applied to explain why young people might be attracted towards those extremes 
that legitimise violent actions.  
This argument will be advanced by a historical analysis of the situation in Northern Ireland as it 
descended into conflict and augmented by a small number of interviews with Republican ex-prisoners 
whose involvement with the IRA dates back to the early years of the conflict. These interviews 
focused on a number of key issues. Firstly, they sought to ascertain the motivations for becoming 
involved with militant republicanism in the first instance. Secondly, the participants discussed the 
influences that shaped their political thinking at that time. Finally, they sought to assess the impact 
that various programmes of political education – both formal and informal – had on their political 
thinking and, more specifically, on their attitudes towards the use of violence.  
The final section of the paper seeks to demonstrate the transferability of these experiences to that of 




Problematic Definitions  
Alex Schmid, in his extensive literature review on “radicalisation”, highlights the difficulties that exist 
when it comes to both defining and using the term. He points out that: 
The terms “radicalisation” and “de-radicalisation” are used widely, but the search for 
what exactly “radicalisation” is, what causes it and how to “de-radicalise” those who are 
considered radicals, violent extremists or terrorists, is a frustrating one.6 
Schmid argues that the ‘popularity of the concept of “radicalisation” stands in no direct relationship to 
its actual explanatory power regarding the root causes of terrorism’,7 whilst Mark Sedgwick, 
similarly, highlights the difficulties that surround the use of a term that ‘is understood and used in a 
variety of different ways’.8  
Defining radical is, therefore, problematic.9 Sedgewick points out that the Oxford English Dictionary 
defines radical as ‘representing or supporting an extreme section of a party’. As such, he argues: 
…the term may be used as a synonym for “extremist”, and in opposition to “moderate”. 
It serves the useful purpose of indicating a relative position on a continuum of organized 
opinion. “Radicalisation” thus indicates movement on that continuum.10 
A historic analysis of radicalism, however, suggests a greater level of complexity than this allows for. 
This dictionary definition, for example, suggests that “radicalism” is almost entirely negative but this 
has not always been the case. Throughout much of the period between the American War of 
Independence and World War I, many within the political mainstreams were keen to extol their own 
“radical” credentials – it was a political outlook that was seen to advocate social and political reform 
that would benefit the wider populace.11 What is more, history has subsequently come to present 
many of those (negatively) deemed “radicals” in their own time in a rather more positive light – the 
suffragette movement being one obvious example. 
This is reinforced by those definitions that link “extremism” with the propensity for violence. 
Although “extremism” may indeed be equated with a willingness to use violence, the same cannot be 
said for “radicals” who, as Schmid argues, ‘are not per se violent’. Although they may ‘share certain 
characteristics’ with violent extremists, he insists that:  
…there are also important differences (such as regarding the willingness to engage in 
critical thinking). It does not follow that a radical attitude must result in violent 
behaviour – a finding well established by decades of research.12   
Cathal McManus has argued that this has parallels with the interpretation of radicalism put forward by 
Paulo Freire during the 1970s.13 McManus points out that Freire adopted a positive interpretation by 
arguing that, although radicalisation entailed an ‘increased commitment to the position one has 
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chosen’, it was ‘predominantly critical, loving, humble, and communicative, and therefore a positive 
stance’. The radical, Freire insisted, will not ‘deny another man’s right to choose, nor does he try to 
impose his own choice’ but rather will attempt to ‘convince and convert, not to crush his opponent’.14 
A key characteristic of radicalism emerging from both Freire and Schmid, therefore, is its criticality; 
radicals will be willing to critically analyse their situation and have an open mind to the views and 
opinions of others. Such a criticality is not a characteristic associated with violent extremism and, as 
such, raises the necessity for an alternative approach. For this, McManus advocated two concepts: 
“sectarianism” and “Othering”.15  
Othering and the process of Sectarianisation 
In identifying radicalism as a positive concept, Freire identified “sectarianism” as being its 
polar opposite. Arguing that sectarianism is ‘predominantly emotional and uncritical’, he presents the 
sectarian as ‘arrogant, antidialogical and thus anticommunicative’. As such, the sectarian will 
‘disrespect’ the ‘choices of others’ and will seek to ‘impose his own choice on everyone else’. 
Furthermore, Freire stresses ‘the inclination of the sectarian to activism’ and ‘sloganizing, which 
generally remains at the level of myth and half-truths and attributes absolute value to the purely 
relative’.16  
McManus, in his analysis of continuing political divisions in Northern Ireland, argues that there is a 
need to better understand how these ‘slogans’, ‘myths’ and ‘half-truths’ become such powerful and 
effective tools. To do so he suggests the need to analyse those processes of Othering that help to shape 
and define group identity but which, more specifically, contribute to the growth of sectarianism.17 
 Othering is defined as a process of identification that establishes similarity and difference 
between groups.18 Whilst such a process of identification is likely/natural, Othering seeks to establish 
a hierarchy with each in-group viewing ‘the Other as in some way lesser’ and as posing some form of 
threat to “our” way of life.19 Grove and Zwi, for example, argue that Othering ‘defines and secures 
one’s identity by distancing and stigmatising an(other)’ and claim that its ‘purpose is to reinforce 
notions of our own “normality”, and to set up the difference of others as a point of deviance’.20  
McManus situates Othering within Anthony Marsella’s ‘constructions of reality’ concept which 
argues that a group develops its sense of superiority through ‘a particularly positive interpretation’ of 
its own status as ‘self-righteous, moral, justified and “good” by virtue of religion, history and 
identity’.21 These culturally constructed perceptions of reality act as the social bond of a community 
and help to provide it with a shared sense of history and solidarity which is further reinforced by 
negative attitudes held towards the Other, who are often seen as, not only lesser, but as a threat and 
danger to the interests/existence of the in-group. As such, conflict, or the potential for conflict, is 
often a consequence of Othering.   
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The potential for conflict is increased by two further aspects of Othering. In the first instance, because 
Othering becomes an important element in generating a group’s social bond it will mean that large 
sections of the populace become susceptible to the sectarianism it can generate. This means, at times 
of heightened tensions, there is potentially a pool of people that may be prepared to turn to violence 
should that be deemed necessary.    
The second consideration lies in the fact that Othering is often a two-way process wherein conflicting 
groups will each become convinced of their own superiority over the evil and/or threatening Other. As 
such, there will exist a belief in both groups that they need to take action against the Other in order to 
defend their own interests. However, each “action” merely serves to reinforce the negative 
perceptions held by their Other and helps to generate increased sectarianism.      
Building on this analysis of Othering, it is possible to present a framework that outlines the 
growth of sectarian attitudes and explains how these are likely to feed extremist attitudes (Figure 1).  
As discussed above it begins on the premise that longer-term processes of Othering have 
helped to create two groups/communities that are susceptible to the type of sectarianism described by 
Freire. Each views the Other with great suspicion and will interpret their actions as being designed to 
undermine or suppress the in-group.    
The second stage in the process is a growing communal reaction against perceived threats 
and/or injustices and which normally takes the form of an activism. This activism will be organised 
along sectarian lines with the interests only of the in-group being considered – thus any fears, 
insecurities or injustices experienced by the Other will largely be ignored. Indeed, it will also ignore 
the fears and any sense of threat felt by the Other arising from the “Sectarian Activism” itself, and any 
negative response by the Other will be interpreted as simply more evidence of their sectarianism. 
Figure 1: Processes of Sectarianisation through Othering 
5 
 
Although the activism will be largely peaceful, it may also take on a ‘low level’ violence – that is to 
say, a violence that is primarily uncoordinated and often reactionary.   
The third stage in the process emerges from the growing frustrations, fears and anger created 
by the “Sectarian Activism” stage. The lack of change brought about by the Activism facilitates an 
analysis which argues that the Other is incapable of changing voluntarily and, as such, a minority will 
come to support the use of armed actions. This may, in certain circumstances, see members of the in-
group apply a historic political analysis – such as a previous demand for national independence – to 
the current crisis. Importantly, whilst only a minority may morally or actively support the violence, 
the majority within the in-group can understand why there are those who have turned to militancy. 
This understanding is grounded in their sharing the same anger/frustrations/sense of fear as the 
militants. 
In turning to violence, of course, (and irrespective of the small numbers involved) the in-group 
reinforces the Othering processes by confirming the negative attitudes held by their Other towards 
them. Due to the uncritical character of sectarianism, the Other in this case can never understand the 
use of this violence because they do not recognise as legitimate the fears/insecurities/grievances of 
their Other. As such, those engaged in violence come to be viewed simply as “evil” and “terrorists” 
who need to be defeated militarily and without compromise. Indeed, when sectarianism predominates, 
compromise is viewed as an act of treachery.22  
In these circumstances, neither group will recognise the role they have played in helping to create – 
and sustain – the conditions for conflict.   
 Stage four, “Extreme Sectarianism” is a stage that only a very few ever reach. It centres on 
the belief that “Us” and “Them” are entirely incompatible and that for “Us” to survive – and thrive – 
there is a need to destroy the Other.  
Although this process of sectarianisation provides a useful framework within which to assess 
the transition towards extremism, there are a number of further important elements within it that also 
need to be considered. 
Firstly, although a political and/or religious idealism will become part of a wider meta-narrative of 
those that come to engage in violence, this will not necessarily be the primary motivation for early 
participation in any sectarian activism. This activism will be inspired initially by individual and later 
group feelings of inequality and/or alienation – the micro- and meso-level narratives. The vast 
majority of those that come to espouse a political/religious ideal will only do so after this initial 
activism and as they fall under the influence of more ideologically driven leaders. 
The second consideration, therefore, is the role played by these ideological leaders who seek to apply 
a meta-narrative to the contemporary context. This application, as mentioned above, will be grounded 
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in a very particular – and one-sided – reading of a historical cause that ignores wider complexities. 
Nevertheless, the narrative will resonate with some activists and will be seen to explain their 
hardships/inequalities/alienation.     
The complex processes that facilitate sectarianisation highlight the need to better understand 
the Othering that lends itself to an individual’s transition towards violence. In particular, there is a 
need to better understand how all the actors in a conflict have contributed to the Othering processes 
that create the conditions for conflict.  
This is by no means easy. Peter Neumann23, in his introduction to the First International Conference 
of Radicalisation and Political Violence, points out that in the ‘highly charged atmosphere’ following 
the 9/11 attacks it became ‘very difficult to discuss the “roots of terrorism”, which some 
commentators claimed was an effort to excuse and justify the killing of ordinary civilians’. The terror 
attacks in America and Europe since 2001, however, have reinforced the need to better understand the 
factors and processes that lead local, often well-integrated individuals, to turn to violence. This 
requires us to move beyond the scope of ‘radicalisation’ which, in the popular media, often tends to 
put the emphasis on the individual perpetrator and ignores wider causes related to long-term Othering.    
It is vital, therefore, to understand Othering and how it helps to generate and sustain conflict and 
sectarian tensions. To do so it is useful to explore how it has impacted elsewhere and in this regards 
Northern Ireland is a useful, if imperfect, comparison. It should be noted, for example, that the recent 
terror attacks carried out in the name of the so-called Islamic State (IS/ISIS) are very different from 
the type of violence witnessed in Northern Ireland over its thirty years of conflict. Indeed, it could be 
argued that at least some elements of ISIS now represent “Extreme Sectarianism” – a stage that no 
grouping in Northern Ireland ever espoused.  
Processes of Sectarianisation and Othering: Lessons from Northern Ireland 
Northern Ireland came into being in 1921 amid much violence and political turmoil. Designed 
as part of a compromise aimed at settling a long-term conflict between the aspirations of Irish 
nationalism and Ulster unionism, its creation merely served to raise new questions concerning how 
the large Catholic/nationalist minority within its territory – approximately one third of the population 
– would become reconciled to a state they opposed. 
Throughout the nineteenth century, Irish Catholics and Ulster Protestants had come to view 
each other with increased suspicion.24 Strongly held religious beliefs25 helped to define new political 
and cultural divisions that brought the island close to civil war in 1914 over the question of Home 
Rule.26  This issue, centring on whether Ireland should have its own parliament in Dublin to deal with 
exclusively Irish matters, was in part a consequence of long-term processes of Othering wherein both 
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communities came to view themselves in a positive light and their Other in an entirely negative 
fashion.27  
Within this, Irish/Ulster Protestants came to view themselves as representing the Protestant British 
Empire in Ireland and as defenders of the true word of God against the idolatrous and superstitious 
Irish Catholicism.28 This combination of politics and religion helped to generate the belief that 
Protestantism was the standard-bearer for liberal democracy and moral righteousness on the island.29 
This was in stark contrast to their perceptions of Irish Catholics who were viewed as a backward 
“race” inclined to laziness and criminality and who, due to their domination by an intolerant Papal 
authority, were incapable of accepting dissenting religious and political views.30 Indeed, popular 
representations of Irish Catholicism within the Protestant community sought to emphasise the threat 
posed by the former, who, they believed, were out to destroy Protestantism in Ireland31; a view 
reinforced by the nationalist movements that emerged over the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries that were seen to have strong clerical support.32 
Similar processes of Othering were also to be found within the Catholic population during the same 
period. This narrative often centred on the idea that the minority Protestant population – aided by a 
political and economic ascendancy established over the previous century – opposed political reforms 
that would allow a more representative democracy to emerge. Catholics had campaigned for greater 
equality within the new United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland (1801) but had come up against 
opposition from Irish Protestants who opposed any concessions to what they perceived as a hostile 
Catholicism; fears the latter often did little to allay.33 This opposition helped to reinforce the already 
well-established belief that Irish Protestantism was grounded in bigotry and sectarianism and 
fundamentally opposed to the emergence of an Irish democracy.34 Within this narrative it was the Irish 
Catholic population that were the champions of liberalism, democracy and tolerance.35  
Crucially, of course, both sides were unable to recognise how their own actions – sectarian activism – 
contributed to enhancing the fears and hostility of their Other. 
These processes of Othering were fundamental in shaping the political culture of Northern 
Ireland in its formative years and ensured that the bitter divisions of the past would continue to plague 
the new state.  
They help to explain, for example, why the Unionist government failed to use the new opportunity 
presented to them to build a state capable of representing all its citizens.36 The reality was that the 
combined sense of hostility towards and fear of their “Other” made any movement towards 
conciliation unlikely.37 Although ‘most Catholics did not actively work against the Northern Ireland 
state’38 both the passive hostility of the majority and the active opposition of a minority helped to feed 
unionist fears and convince them that their negative perceptions of the Other was accurate. This was 
seen to justify, in spite of a stated commitment towards the values of liberal democracy, their pursuing 
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policies of discrimination designed to limit the political, social and economic participation of 
Catholics in the state39; reflecting McManus’s argument that Othering will lead groups to adopt 
policies that very often contradict what they claim to stand for.40 
The discrimination experienced by Catholics, of course, merely reinforced their negative 
perceptions of Ulster Protestantism and provided them with further evidence of what they perceived 
to be the bigotry and sectarianism of the Unionist administration. Over time, this helped to generate a 
strong sense of communal grievance, which, Elliott argues, ‘produced a highly sensitised victim 
psychology’.41  
By the late 1950s, however, there were signs this situation was starting to change and that some 
within the Catholic population were beginning to question traditional nationalist narratives; their 
focus turning instead to addressing the socio-economic ills faced by large sections of the 
community.42  
Two key factors aided this process.  
In the first instance there was a growing acceptance by many Catholics that partition was going to be 
a reality for the foreseeable future – a fact emphasised by the declaration of a Republic for the 26 
County state in 1948.43 
The second factor lay in the fact that significant sections of the Catholic population had started to 
benefit from the welfare reforms introduced in Britain during the 1940s and, in particular, from the 
educational reforms of the period.44 The 1947 Education Act (Northern Ireland) had created new 
opportunities for Catholics to access both a grammar school education and, subsequently, higher 
education, which helped to raise the socio-economic ambitions of sections of the population. By the 
late 1950s and early 1960s, the first generation of these Catholic graduates were emerging with high 
expectations for their future and many were even beginning to think about this future within the 
context of the partitioned state they had been brought up to dislike so much.45 For this to become a 
reality, however, they argued that the state needed to change and reforms introduced that would 
deliver greater equality and justice.  
The demands being made, essentially seeking British rights for British citizens, were seen to mark a 
new departure for the Catholic population in Northern Ireland; ‘reform not revolution’ was now 
seemingly the key goal. Under the political leadership of the liberal unionist Prime Minister, Terence 
O’Neill, it initially looked as if progress could be made46 but these hopes were dashed as O’Neill, 
under pressure from his own hard-line rank and file, failed to deliver on his early promise. The anger 
and frustration that this generated amongst Northern Catholics manifested itself in a US style civil 
rights movement that aimed to put greater pressure on Stormont to implement reforms.  
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In so doing, however, they aggravated unionists who, as Richard Rose has highlighted, largely 
rejected the idea that there was discrimination in Northern Ireland.47 For Unionist leaders, Northern 
Ireland was a bastion of British democracy48 whilst for working class unionists/loyalists, there was an 
added sense of grievance in that they believed they faced similar social issues as their Catholic 
counterparts.49 As such, many within unionism came to view the civil rights cause as a front for Irish 
nationalism and, more specifically, the Irish Republican Army (IRA)50 and, consequently, refused to 
acknowledge the genuine grievances being raised.  
The subsequent loyalist campaigns against the civil rights movement represent a drift into a sectarian 
activism that centred on a growing perception of being under threat from their Other. These fears not 
only prevented the in-group from recognising the legitimate grievances of their Other, but it also led 
them to take actions that ran contrary to the principles they claimed to represent, namely, liberal 
democracy and tolerance of dissenting voices.  
In the same vein, however, the civil rights movement also represented a drift into sectarian 
activism by sections of the Catholic population. The ‘highly sensitised victim psychology’ identified 
by Elliott, ensured that many within that community did not fully recognise the dire social and 
economic situation faced by their Protestant counterparts whose own socio-economic struggles did 
not figure prominently in the demands for change being made. Indeed, a key component of the 
nationalist narrative by the 1950s and 1960s was the sweeping generalisation that the Protestant 
working classes were a privileged community, rewarded for their loyalty to the Unionist elite.51  
The hostile and, eventually, violent unionist response to the civil rights campaign served to 
generate new levels of anger and frustration within the Catholic population – an anger that also 
eventually erupted into violence at civil rights marches between demonstrators and the Royal Ulster 
Constabulary (RUC).52 This violence, in turn, reinforced the unionist fears that the Civil Rights 
movement was always little more than a front for militant republicanism.  
The initial violence by both communities, but only ever a minority in each, served to hasten 
the drift into stage three of the process of sectarianisation through Othering – that of “Sectarian 
Violence”. In seeking to understand this transition it is important to get a clearer sense of the 
motivations that led people to join a militant organisation that would, ultimately, go on to wage a 
violent thirty-year campaign against the state.  
Complex Dynamics of “Sectarian Violence”: Politics of Irish Republicanism 
Irish republicanism in the 1960s, reflecting the wider situation of northern Catholics, was 
experiencing a period of transition.53 The IRA started the decade in the middle of a military campaign, 
launched in 1956, that was having little meaningful impact. In 1962, they formally called an end to 
their efforts and blamed its failure on the wider Catholic population ‘whose minds have been 
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deliberately distracted from the supreme issue facing the Irish people - the unity and freedom of 
Ireland.’54 This statement is very much symbolic of the divide that had emerged between Northern 
Catholics and republicanism – a divide that the republican movement sought to bridge throughout 
much of the 1960s.55  
Although republicanism did enjoy a period of growth during the middle part of the decade, it was only 
between 1968 and 1972, as the violence surrounding the civil rights demonstrations intensified, that 
significant numbers of (young) people joined the movement. Crucially, these new recruits were not 
necessarily joining because of a long-term political attachment to the republican ideal but because of 
the tensions generated by the Sectarian Activism of the period. 
This can be seen in the testimony of many who joined the IRA at that time. Former IRA prisoner and 
hunger-striker Gerard Hodgkins, for example, in an interview with journalist Peter Taylor, when 
asked if he had been aware of the IRA prior to his joining states:  
No, not really. The IRA would be a sort of folk memory. You would see on some walls 
graffiti, ‘Join Your Local Unit’, or ‘IRA’ or a Tricolour painted on the wall. It was just 
something you’d seen and you knew they were rebels. But really I hadn’t a clue what 
they were.56 
This was further evident in the reflections of another IRA man, Tony Miller, who recalls how he was 
encouraged into action by his experiences of “The Battle of the Bogside”.57 He recalls how this 
confrontation between Catholic youths and the RUC instilled in him a ‘serious hatred’ for the police 
and desire to ‘sort of take revenge because you saw people getting battered and choked with CS 
gas’.58 It is worth noting here that the violent police response – coupled with the early counter-
insurgency approach of the British military in places such as Derry (Bloody Sunday, 30th January 
1972) and Ballymurphy (9-11 August 1971), as well as the use of internment without trial59 – helped 
to reinforce a growing sense of anger against the state. The IRA, and more specifically the Provisional 
IRA that emerged in early 1970, provided a mechanism to not only ‘take revenge’ but also, 
eventually, the initiative. In so doing, however, it reverted to an older republican (meta)-narrative that 
shifted the issue away from the original source of conflict – civil rights – to the more traditional issue 
of Irish unity. Given the tensions of the period this narrative was now seen as having greater 
resonance to those already caught up in increased violence.  
These developments had major implications for the republican movement as its ranks were 
swelled by significant numbers of young men and women angered by the events around them. Gerry 
Adams has argued that the movement was ‘ill-prepared and unable to cope with the needs and 
potential of that period’ and identifies the ‘primary problem’ as being a ‘lack of politics’. This, he 
argues, ensured that: 
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…the reinvigorated republican struggle which emerged then was an inadequate one, 
because the only republican organization which arose from the ashes was a military one: 
it had little or no proper educational process, nor formal politicization courses, and there 
was scant regard paid by the leadership to such needs.60 
A primary consequence of this failing was that it ensured a generation of fighters that, initially, lacked 
a deep grounding in the republicanism they claimed to be fighting for. As the conflict intensified, and 
the IRA went on the offensive, these new recruits merely came to espouse the somewhat simplistic 
notion of “Brits Out”61 and there was little consideration given to a political strategy capable of 
delivering their main goal of Irish unity.62 Importantly, the key means for addressing such issues did 
eventually arise in the prisons.63   
Transformative Education and the Prisons: Learning for War – Educating for Peace 
 Commenting on a post on the republican blog site ‘The Pensive Quill’, one contributor, 
identified as “Dixie”, states: 
Most of us, if we are truthful, who joined the Republican Movement at an early age; I 
was 16 and spotted at the front of riots, hadn't a clue about 'Isms' socialism or otherwise. 
It wasn't until the prison system swallowed us up that I heard of such things. In fact I first 
heard about socialism walking round the yard while on remand from Red Micky Devine. 
What kept us going through the Blanket Protest was the belief that we could bring about 
the ideals we learnt from Micky, Bobby and the likes of Tommy McKearney… I left jail 
with a head full of ideas which I hoped would change things for the better...64 
This reflects the experiences of many who joined the ranks of the IRA in the early years of the 
conflict and who spent considerable periods incarcerated as a result.   
One IRA ex-prisoner (ExP1), interviewed in late 2014, described growing up in North Belfast with 
little political awareness of the ‘national question’; rather, he talks about a politics that tended to 
centre on trade union and labour issues. He maintained that he knew little about the history of Irish 
nationalism and republicanism, neither of which figured prominently either in the home or at school. 
His first experiences of this politics stemmed from the early years of the civil rights demonstrations 
and, more specifically, when his family faced threats of being burned out of their home by loyalists. 
By his mid-teens he had joined the republican movement and ended up in prison as a result. 
He describes how his prison experiences had a significant impact on his political thinking, which, up 
until then, had focused exclusively on advancing the “armed struggle” he had joined. He used his time 
to study – informally – politics and Irish history and participated in the many political debates being 
organised by republican prisoners. Central to his story was the radical education he experienced with 
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thinkers such as James Connolly, Karl Marx and Paulo Freire amongst the required reading alongside 
the revolutionary writings of Che Guevara.  
Of huge importance in this process, as highlighted in the Dixie quote above, is the role played by 
ideological leaders in pushing this education.65 These figures were already well grounded in a 
particular political narrative – a politics normally instilled through family/communal connections that 
often dated back generations – and capable of applying their analysis to explain contemporary events. 
They presented an argument that the events of the time – the unionist response to the civil rights 
movement, for example – needed to be understood within a wider historical context and that lived 
injustices were merely the latest example of the sectarian Other demonstrating that it could not, and 
would not, tolerate “Us”. The priority, therefore, was not to reform the status quo but to return to a 
historic ideal.    
As such, it is important to recognise that the primary aim of initial debates and educational 
programmes in the prisons was to give political context – and thus a sense of legitimacy – to the 
growing militancy of the IRA and were certainly not an early attempt to replace the ‘armed struggle’ 
with a purely political activism.66  
Despite this, however, it is clear that the programmes, both formal and informal, did have a longer-
term impact on how the prisoners came to view the conflict. 
ExP1, for example, describes how his studies made him more aware of the complexities of the 
conflict and encouraged him to enter into a period of “self-evaluation” leading to a questioning of the 
“war” by the late 1970s. This was, he believed, quite common amongst the prisoners although it was 
never talked about given the heightened tensions in the prisons over political status.67 The prison 
conflict of the late 1970s and early 1980s, he argues, set back these critical reflective processes by at 
least a decade when programmes of study were re-established.68  
An important consideration, therefore, reflected in the comments by both “Dixie” and ExP1, is that a 
real understanding of their “isms” only came about after their joining the republican movement and, 
in both cases, the increased sense of radicalism gained from their politicisation greatly impacted their 
political thinking and priorities.  
This was evident from other interviews conducted and, importantly, even from those who claimed to 
have been politicised prior to joining the movement. 
Ex-Prisoner 2 (ExP2),69 although not coming from a particularly political family, did begin to take an 
interest in republican politics during the 1960s and was a participant in various civil rights 
demonstrations. Like Adams, he claims that the movement lacked strategic thinking and direction 
during the 1970s but that this had started to change during the 1980s due, in no small part, to the 
educational programmes – formal and informal – in the prisons. On a personal note he claimed that 
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the debates and discussions, alongside reading groups and formal programmes, encouraged him to 
cast a ‘critical eye’ on republican strategy and this included a critical reflection of the ‘armed 
struggle’.  
As with ExP1, the content of the debates were also of importance for ExP2. He described discussions 
that questioned the morality of conflict and how these were being influenced by a growing realisation 
that military actions were not likely to bring about republican objectives. Again, the radical ideologies 
that framed these discussions stood out, with figures such as Freire, Marx and Maurice Cornforth 
mentioned.   
ExP370 had a somewhat different experience from the previous interviewees in that he was 
slightly younger and joined the IRA at a time when the conflict was already at its height in the 
1972/73 period. His decision to join was influenced by what he described as a feeling of excitement 
that the IRA was part of a wider revolution against colonialism, and referenced events in 
Mozambique, Angola and Kenya, as well as the writings of figures such as Frantz Fanon, as being 
particularly influential.  
Again, despite the apparent politicisation prior to his joining, the debates and discussions in prison 
seem to have had a similar impact on his thinking. Whilst they reinforced his political radicalism – his 
commitment to the idea of a socialist republic, for example – they also led him to question the ability 
of the ‘armed struggle’ to advance this ideal. He claims that he became increasingly cognisant of the 
limitations of the struggle and convinced of the need to develop a radical political movement capable 
of creating the type of society he believed was envisaged in the historic 1916 Proclamation of 
Independence.71   
 These developments were of crucial importance when it came to laying the foundations for 
the peace process. They highlight that there were at least some republican activists already privately 
questioning the IRA’s military campaign at a time when leading republicans were beginning to devise 
their ‘armalite and ballot box’ strategy72 – a strategy that would eventually put a much greater 
emphasis on developing Sinn Féin as a political voice for republicanism. The prison debates, 
discussions and programmes of education had helped to reframe the nature of the movement’s 
radicalism to one more in line with that presented by Freire. Although republicans retained a 
‘commitment to the position one has chosen’, they were now willing to listen to the views and 
opinions of the Other/s. These programmes, therefore, helped to pave the way for a more strategically 
engaged republican base to emerge and which possessed a clearer focus on republican aims and 
objectives that extended over and above advancing the ‘war’.73 When, therefore, the republican 
leadership eventually began to speak about a peace process, it found a movement largely willing and 
able to engage with such an idea; albeit the Othering generated by the years of conflict has ensured a 
relatively slow process beset with various stumbling blocks.74 
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  The conflict in Northern Ireland demonstrates the outworkings of the Process of 
Sectarianisation and highlights the complex dynamics that help to generate and sustain violence. Of 
particular importance is the transition from the micro- to the meso- to the meta-narrative that is seen 
to legitimise such violence. 
In the first instance we can identify a struggle within elements of the Catholic community. This 
centred on local and individual grievances against a state that they felt detached from, pitted against 
their rising socio-economic ambitions. This we can describe as a micro-level narrative/s. The 
grievances felt were reinforced by what became an epoch-defining moment – the civil rights 
movement – which generated an increased level of Othering leading to a wider sense of a ‘Catholic 
community’ ever more detached from the Unionist state. This can be viewed as the meso-level 
narrative. Finally, we can identify a meta-narrative wherein a wider/historic political ideal came to be 
applied to contemporary political events and which, for a minority, was seen to justify/legitimise the 
use of violence to bring about change.75 
Having explored the nature of this process, it is important to determine how transferable it might be to 
the current issue confronting many European countries – Islamist extremism.       
Othering and Islamist Extremism in Europe 
 On Monday 22nd May 2017, a 22-year old British Muslim, Salman Abedi, detonated a home-
made bomb in the foyer of Manchester Arena as crowds left following a concert by the pop singer 
Ariana Grande. The bomb killed twenty-two people, injured dozens more and sent shock waves 
across British society.76  
This, and similar terror attacks carried out in major towns and cities across Europe, raise important 
questions about the motivations for carrying out such indiscriminate acts of violence against innocent 
civilians.77 These questions take on greater importance when it is considered that the attacks are often 
carried out by people, like Abedi, who are born and/or raised in Europe and who are often attacking 
the very community from which they came.78 This is further reinforced by the significant number of 
Muslims that have recently left Europe to fight for Islamist groups in both Syria and Iraq.79   
In seeking to understand these motivations it is important to explore the role of Othering and how it 
aids a process of sectarianism. As part of this, it is possible to identify micro-, meso- and meta-
narratives amongst sections of the Muslim community in Europe that facilitate this transition. 
Firstly, it is important to recognise an underlying tension within sections of the Muslim community 
that have settled in the West. Although many have settled in Europe to exploit the socio-economic 
opportunities it provides, a minority struggle to overcome long-held negative views of the West that 
they have been socialised with. A Gallup poll from March 2002, for example, found that a majority of 
residents surveyed in nine Islamic countries believed that ‘Westerners have immoral lifestyles and 
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weak family values’. Those polled further believed that the West does not respect Islam and that 
Westerners are, in general, ‘arrogant and believe their societies and civilization are more superior and 
advanced’.80 Such negative views of the Other, which will foster their own sense of in-group 
superiority, transfer with those that settle in the West.  
This is evident in the experiences portrayed by Maajid Nawaz in his autobiographical account Radical 
which depicts his life experiences growing up in Britain during the 1980s and 1990s.81 The picture 
presented by Nawaz is one that, in many ways, resonates with elements of the Catholic community’s 
situation in Northern Ireland during the 1950s and 1960s. We see, for example, that Nawaz was raised 
in a household with conflicting social and political discourses. On his mother’s side, he describes a 
determination to use the opportunities for socio-economic progress that moving to Britain provided 
and highlights the emphasis placed on ‘the need to study, to work hard and make the most of 
themselves’.82 This contrasts, however, with the politics espoused by his father who is described as 
being ‘anti-colonial’ and who regularly held political discussions on such matters in the house. 
Exposure to such views serve as a form of socialisation for younger generations into a political culture 
that spawns doubt about their new homeland – seen to be that of the ‘coloniser’. Although such a 
politics may initially appear to conflict with their own realities and priorities, specifically their social 
and economic ambitions, it nevertheless creates a negativity that feeds a process of Othering. This is 
reinforced by negative experiences they encounter, such as racial victimisation or (perceived) social 
barriers that hinder their socio-economic development.83 All of this contributes to what Neumann 
describes as a ‘lack of identification with the Western societies they (or most of them) were born and 
grew up in’.84   
To address such issues there has been a significant number of community organisations established, 
since the 1990s, that seek to better represent Muslim interests.85 Such groups, which have developed 
across many Western countries, represent a form of “sectarian activism”. The most prominent in the 
UK, for example, the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), lists amongst its aims and objectives the 
strengthening of ‘all existing efforts being made for the benefit of the Muslim community’ and ‘the 
eradication of disadvantages and forms of discrimination faced by Muslims’.86       
Although such groups, like the civil rights movement in Northern Ireland, claim to be ‘non-
sectarian’87, they are an important part of the process of sectarianisation. Operating through peaceful 
and constitutional means, they campaign for positive change for their particular in-group and, as such, 
naturalise the idea of a separation from the Other – even those confronted with similar socio-
economic issues. As was the case in Northern Ireland during the 1960s, this has helped to generate a 




Although these groups have provided an important service for Muslim communities across Europe, 
their work was made more difficult as a consequence of what was an epoch-defining moment – the 
September 11th attacks of 2001. These attacks, alongside others such as those in Madrid (2004) and 
London (2005), helped to intensify the processes of Othering in Western Europe as manifested in a 
growth of anti-Islam89 and anti-immigration sentiment and the subsequent rise of ‘populist radical 
right’ parties across the continent.90 These parties, grounded in a ‘nativist’ political outlook have been 
to the forefront in propagating the idea that all Muslims are terrorists and that Islam is an inherently 
violent religion incompatible with Western values.91 The more recent terror attacks in Europe have 
served to further reinforce and popularise such views amongst sections of the European population 
and are, increasingly, becoming mainstreamed through policies designed to curtail immigration.92 
Fawaz Gerges argues that: 
A climate of fear and panic has taken hold of the European and American imagination. 
The terrorist threat, though real, has been blown up out of proportion with British Prime 
Minister [then David Cameron] saying that ISIS poses an “existential” threat to his 
country, a statement that mischaracterizes a limited menace with a strategic. In the US, in 
an attempt to reduce the danger to the homeland, Republican presidential candidates have 
called for banning Muslims from entering the country and for bombing civilians in Iraq 
and Syria, a recipe that aides Salifi-jihadists like ISIS.93   
These responses to the Islamist terror threat have acted as a self-fulfilling prophecy. As radical right 
parties make political gains by exploiting and/or promoting anti-Islam sentiment, they enhance 
perceptions of social exclusion amongst (young) Muslims, particularly as their narratives become 
ever-more mainstreamed.94 This alienation has been further enhanced by events associated with the 
“War on Terror” and, in particular, the wars in Iraq and Syria which have led to the deaths of 
hundreds of innocent Muslim civilians – deaths that some in the Muslim community believe are 
under-reported or trivialised in contrast to Western casualties.95  
It is at this stage that a meta-narrative becomes crucial.  
Although many, initially, do not think of themselves within the context of the ummah, they have, due 
to Othering, come to view themselves as being part of a Muslim community increasingly detached 
from Western society. The meta-narrative of groups such as al Qaeda and ISIS seeks to give this 
detachment a new and wider context wherein previous local and national experiences are placed 
within a global (historic) framework.96 
In particular, they do much to play upon and promote the idea that the West is inherently hostile to 
Islam and Muslim interests and seek to use both historical and contemporary events/issues to 
reinforce their point. 97 Stern and Berger draw attention to the role played by various military conflicts 
or genocidal campaigns, ‘such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan or the genocide in Bosnia’, in the 
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propaganda of jihadist groups98, whilst both Byman99 and Hegghammer and Wagemakers100  highlight 
the historic role that has been played by the Palestinian issue in such publicity.101 More recently the 
focus has centred on the crises surrounding Iraq and Syria and, as highlighted above, the deaths of 
innocent civilians at the hands of “invaders” and “infidels”. Sageman, for example, found that most of 
the ‘neojihadis’ he interviewed ‘attributed their politicization to watching videos of slaughtered 
Muslims in distant lands’.102 This can be seen to represent the first key element of the jihadi narrative 
that presents Muslims as victims of an aggressive West that views Islam as its enemy.  
A central part of this jihadi story is the idea that Muslims, for too long, have been happy to play the 
victims and, worse still, many now strive to imitate those that inflict such sufferings. ISIS urge young 
Muslims to fight back against the “near” enemy103 by building an Islamic State that does not respect 
the artificial boundaries established by the West and its “allies”.104 In so doing they talk of an epic 
battle between “us” and “them” – “good” and “evil” – that seeks to restore “true” Islam to its rightful 
place.105 For this to happen the adherents of “true Islam” need to confront, not only the threat posed 
by the West, but also those Muslims that are deemed to have abandoned their Islamic ways having 
embraced Western values and morals.  
As such, the violence espoused by ISIS has something of a redemptive character wherein those that 
feel they have fallen by the wayside can find favour again by fighting, and dying, for the caliphate, 
‘the abandoned obligation of the era’.106          
This has a considerable impact on the type of people that groups such as ISIS can appeal to. While 
they will, of course, be able to attract those impacted by the deep sectarian divisions in Muslim 
countries, they will also appeal to those not necessarily grounded in a deep understanding of Islam, 
particularly in the West.107 Recent research by Basra, Neumann and Brunner108 has shown that many 
recruits into the ranks of jihadi groups have lengthy criminal pasts and have only recently become 
adherents to their Islamic faith.109 What is more, as Roy110 points out, many of the new recruits will 
have shown little political interest previously and will have no history of involvement in campaigns 
traditionally associated with Islamist groups. This, indeed, is an important consequence of the meta-
narrative pushed by jihadi groups who argue that political action is pointless and changes nothing. 
ISIS, in particular, rally against a “bended knee” political action and argue for a much more forceful 
approach to looking after Muslim interests111 - a message that resonates with a generation rebelling 
against the compromising previous generation.112   
The key point emerging from the turn to violence therefore, as was the case in Northern Ireland, 
is the failure of politics to address genuine Muslim grievances at local, national and international 
levels.113 Given, however, that new recruits into extremist groups are not necessarily inspired by a 
religious fundamentalism should offer hope that measures can be taken to prevent others from turning 
to violence.114  
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This requires Western governments to recognise the Othering processes that are facilitating a 
sectarianisation of society more broadly and which are not confined to the Muslim community. As 
such, there is a need to move away from those policies that simply place an onus on Muslim 
communities to address ‘radicalisation’ within their ranks, and adopt strategies that challenge 
sectarianism in its entirety.    
Three key priorities emerge from this. 
At a local and national level there is a need to address the factors that have facilitated the rise of the 
radical right across Western society and to more directly challenge their narrative that seeks to blame 
all contemporary social ills on immigration and, specifically, Islam. Central to this is the need for 
programmes that can facilitate (cross community) discussion on such topics as nationhood, citizenship 
and diversity and which challenge stereotypical notions of “us and them”, highlighting the complex 
realities of national identity.115 
Secondly, there is a need to provide new opportunities for young Muslims to engage more 
constructively with politics. In the first instance, this can centre on programmes that encourage 
‘radical’ political thinking but which highlight the ineffectiveness of violence to achieve end goals.116 
These programmes should encourage strategic thinking around addressing key concerns. 
Finally, dealing with such concerns will require a commitment, on the part of government, to invest in 
local and national initiatives that address perceptions of social inequality and exclusion. Crucially, it 
also necessitates a commitment to addressing the wider macro-narratives that have a fundamental role 
in sustaining Othering across generations. This includes prioritising long-running sores such as the 
Palestinian issue, as well as securing greater stability across the wider Middle-East.   
Conclusion 
There remains much to learn from the conflict and subsequent peace process in Northern Ireland. As 
this paper has argued, this is particularly true in terms of understanding the complex dynamics that 
help to generate and sustain violence.  
By developing a “Process of Sectarianisation through Othering”, this paper has argued that there is a 
need to move away from the idea of “radicalisation” as a negative concept. Indeed, based on an 
analysis of the impact of educational programmes amongst republican prisoners in Northern Ireland, it 
has been suggested that an increased political “radicalisation” helped to facilitate a process of critical 
reflection on the IRA’s armed campaign and its ability to further their aspirations. 
As such, it has been argued that similar community programmes may be of benefit in addressing the 
issue of Islamist extremism. Through an exploration of the processes of Othering that have increased 
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sectarianism between elements of Islam and the West, the paper draws attention to the complexities 
driving extremism and the need that exists to better confront such processes.  
Central to this are political programmes of education that can generate better strategic thinking around 
how to deal with those social ills that feed sectarianism across society – including that currently 
manifesting itself in the rise of “radical right” parties.  
Crucially, it has also been argued that there is an onus on Western governments to deal with a wider 
meta-narrative that sustains Othering across generations of Muslims with a priority given to long-
running issues such as that of Palestine.  
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